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This article will explore the image of the Royal Navy’s battleships in British 
society between 1920 and 1960. Although much of what follows might be said to apply 
to Royal Navy as a whole, particularly ‘glamorous’ vessels such as aircraft carriers, 
cruisers and destroyers, it is the contention of this piece that the Royal Navy’s battleships 
by virtue of their sheer size and power captured the public imagination more than any 
other type of warship. The study of the image of the battleship in popular culture provides 
a significant insight into the atmosphere of Britain helping to reveal and highlight 
attitudes not just towards the Royal Navy, but also towards politics, the empire and 
Britain’s role in the world. Christopher M. Bell’s recent work has revealed that the 
Admiralty had an ambiguous attitude towards propaganda and publicity in the inter-war 
years. Disdainful of what it regarded as cheap appeals to the popular imagination, at the 
same time the Admiralty realised that it had to maintain the profile of the Navy. As 
foreign navies expanded abroad and the RAF tirelessly highlighted its benefits at home, 
the Admiralty rather reluctantly became involved in publicity activities.[2] Ralph 
Harrington’s has recently the great importance of HMS Hood to the British people 
showing that it was far more than a utilitarian and functional piece of equipment.[3] This 
article seeks to expand Harrington’s thesis by looking at British battleships in general, 
and place them within the wider framework of British society between 1920 and 1960, 
the year in which the last British battleship, Vanguard, was scrapped.[4] The article will 
examine the political and military arguments behind British naval policy in general, and 
the attitude towards battleships in particular. From this point, it will go on to the main 
theme of the piece: an exploration of the image of battleships in British culture, and how 
they were regarded as symbols of local, national and imperial pride and security. 
Although many inter-war criticisms of battleships were proven by events during the 
Second World War, it will be shown that they continued to exert an important grip on the 
national imagination. Finally, the piece will turn to the case of Britain’s last battleship, 
HMS Vanguard, and show how it came to symbolise the passing of an era. 
At the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 the Royal Navy seemed 
invincible. The Treaty of Versailles demanded the end of Germany’s ambitions for naval 
supremacy. Britain appeared to be the undisputed master of the world’s seas. However, 
the reality was somewhat different. A new threat had arisen which came not so much 
from former enemies as former allies. Both the United States and Japan had entered the 
naval arena; both had built strong, modern navies and both had ambitions to erode 
Britain’s influence over the world. 
            In addition, the Great War had had an enormously debilitating effect on Britain’s 
economy and trading position. By concentrating on supplying its armed forces during 
four years of war, Britain had let its trading position slip. Markets it once dominated 
turned to other buyers and suppliers. Financing the war had also forced a huge burden 
onto the British economy. In 1914, Britain’s national debt was £650 million; by 1919 it 
stood at £7,345 million, of which £1,365 million was owed to the USA.[5] 
            The British government sought to make huge cuts in expenditure and defence 
expenditure appeared the most promising. Arguing that a war against a first class foe was 
highly unlikely for at least ten years, in 1919 the British government decided to adjust 
defence spending accordingly, and this principle dominated defence expenditure until 
1932. In 1918-19, the naval budget was £344 million; by 1921 it had been cut to £60 
million.[6] 
            Fortunately for British governments, such short-term thinking was given a gloss 
of respectability by connecting it to high-minded principles. Pacifist principles and lofty 
moral tones infused the thinking of Ramsay Macdonald and Stanley Baldwin in the 
twenties and thirties. They were convinced that no sane Briton would ever support great 
armaments programmes again, and they spent a good deal of time telling their colleagues 
within their respective parties that disarmament and a commitment to international 
arbitration were the only safe foreign and defence policies to follow. 
            Intimately connected with this supposed rejection of militarism was the concept 
of enlightened world government. The Paris Peace Conference had created a ‘new 
organisation, the League of Nations, designed to arbitrate in international disputes and 
maintain world order through the collective will of civilised governments. Never again 
would nations blunder into war unthinkingly and without having first been ordered to 
consider their positions by the League. However, many naval analysts looked fearfully at 
the US and Japanese navies and urged a reconsideration of the position. The position of 
the USA was extremely ambiguous for it had decided not to join the League and was 
therefore unaffected by commitments to collective security. Once again, the British 
government was saved from an assessment of such arguments by the call of international 
co-operation. In the twenties British governments sought to make a virtue out of the harsh 
realities of the new situation.             
            Invited to attend a naval conference in Washington, the British government 
eagerly accepted and then often acted against the advice of the Admiralty. The 
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 set strict ratios on Britain, the USA and Japan in terms 
of capital ships (5:5:3 respectively, a move that humiliated Japan). An American proposal 
for a ten-year capital ship building ‘holiday’ was also accepted. Admiral Beatty, 
commander of the British battlecruiser fleet at the Battle of Jutland in 1916, and by this 
time First Sea Lord, argued that such move would be highly dangerous to Britain as it 
would degrade building facilities and would mean that Britain’s already antiquated fleet 
would decay still further. However, the Treaty allowed Britain to complete two new 
battleships and so Beatty’s objections were stifled. 
As the ten-year break agreed at Washington approached its end in 1931, the 
Admiralty was keen to begin construction on new ships, but in order to keep costs to a 
minimum was equally keen that no ship should exceed 28,500 tons. For the next four 
years successive British governments vacillated over the question of naval rebuilding. 
Placing faith in disarmament did not please the Admiralty especially as the French and 
Italians refused to sign the Washington treaty’s successor signed in London in 1930. This 
left the Royal Navy severely constrained while the French and Italians built huge ships 
such as the 35,000 giants Richelieu, Littorio and Vittorio Veneto. At the same time 
Germany re-entered the scene as a major naval player with the 32,000- ton ships 
Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, which was then trumped by the massive 42,000 ton 
Bismarck launched in 1936. Unable and unwilling to compete with this activity the 
British attempted to retrieve the situation by signing a naval agreement with Germany in 
1935. Germany agreed to limit its navy to thirty-five per cent of the Royal Navy with no 
submarines and accepted the Washington tonnage limitations. The Bismarck, which was 
already under construction, was largely ignored as a fait accompli. 
By 1934 it was becoming clear to the Admiralty that Britain was being left 
behind, but Britain was bound by the London treaty and could not move before it expired 
in December 1936. There were also plans for an immediate successor conference and 
treaty, which would aim to contain naval armaments. The contradiction between hope 
and reality was truly astonishing. 
The Admiralty had, however, been quietly forging ahead with their new plans. In 
1933 the Controller of the Navy had submitted a memo to the Assistant Chief of Naval 
Staff laying down the chief considerations in terms of new construction. He urged three 
new fast capital ships, capable of dealing with any foreign capital ship either in 
production or proposed. That the ships would probably be in commission by 1941 and 
they should have a twenty-year life expectancy. That in the first ten years of their lives, 
the ships should expect to cope with 15-16-inch guns, with a possibility of much large 
calibre guns. Significantly, he also predicted that air attack would become a much more 
distinct threat, that extreme range gun fire needed to be considered, as did the alternative 
of close range attack by torpedo.[7] It ended on the usual note that the economy needed to 
be considered in construction. These considerations were drawn up into full proposals by 
June 1933 
International developments led to further refinements in planning, expressed in a 
meeting on 20 September 1935 when the Sea Lords concluded that the new ships should 
be armed with nine 15- inch guns and have a speed of not less than 29 knots. These ships 
were designed with European navies in mind, in the full knowledge that they would be 
inferior to Japanese and US ships. But a month later, the American government appeared 
to offer a significant concession when it stated that it was prepared to accept 14-inch guns 
on 35,000 ton ships, provided the Japanese could be persuaded to agree. This placed the 
Admiralty in an uncomfortable position, if the naval talks were successful, plans for 15-
inch gun ships were redundant, but if not they needed to press ahead quickly as guns and 
gun mountings would need to be ordered before the end of the year if the ships were to be 
in commission by 1940. On October 10 the Admiralty dealt with this situation by 
proposing 14- inch guns in 35,000-ton ships capable of 28 knots. This decision was 
accepted by the cabinet in November and became the basis for the re-negotiation of the 
London treaty. 
            In a concession designed to make the treaty look more attractive to the Japanese 
building ratios were scrapped and much greater emphasis was placed instead on size and 
calibre limitations. Britain, France and the USA duly ratified the treaty in March 1936, 
though Italy withheld its agreement until December 1938 and Japan refused to sign. 
Japan was given until April 1937 to agree, if it had not signed by then the calibre was to 
revert to 16- inches. Britain then negotiated similar treaties with Russia and Germany, 
both ratified in November 1937, though in both cases the calibre agreed to was 16- inch. 
This gave the Navy the chance to move ahead on the ship designs submitted on 12 
November 1935, and in November 1937 the five ships of the King George V class were 
finally laid down with the 14- inch gun as the standard heavy armament.But not one of the 
ships would be ready by 1939, even with the acceleration of the programme. Such was 
the demand on wartime labour and dockyard capacity that work had to suspended on two 
of the ships for three and six months.[8] 
            Naval historians have debated whether the Royal Navy (and indeed any other 
navy) should have built battleships at all. The rise of air power, many have argued, sealed 
the fate of the battleship. Large and cumbersome, the battleship was a dinosaur by the 
twenties and thirties and fatally vulnerable to air attack according to this school of 
interpretation. The debate has been characterised as one that split navies between a 
younger, dynamic group who argued the case of the supremacy of aviation against the 
older men who remained wedded to their reactionary ideas of all-big-gun ships engaging 
each other in blue water. Geoffrey Till has argued that such interpretations of the Royal 
Navy are crude caricatures. He sees the Navy as one in which technological innovation 
was being discussed the whole time and informed doctrinal debate. According to Till, air 
power was taken seriously, but as an unproven force it could not be allowed to dominate 
thinking and planning entirely.[9] 
For over a century the British people had been subjected to naval propaganda 
glorifying the role of the senior service. In 1894 the Navy League came into existence 
and promoted the Navy with religious zeal. By 1914 it had over 120,000 members and 
extolled the virtues of a great fleet to the nation. When the revolutionary HMS 
Dreadnought was launched in 1906, it became a symbol on which to concentrate hearts 
and minds: the great battleship became the obsession of the British people. A naval 
building race with Germany was powered on in part by the press’s careful management 
of public hysteria for Dreadnoughts, a hysteria the Liberal government could not dare to 
ignore.[10] 
            During the Great War, the Royal Navy’s battleships had played an important but 
largely unglamorous role.[11] However, the lack of good copy did not mean they were 
forgotten. The press and British people retained a keen interest in British battleships 
throughout the twenties and thirties. The twists and turns of policy and developments in 
naval strategy were not, therefore, the preserve of government, diplomatic and naval 
circles, they were presented to the British public via the media. Battleships were evidence 
of national virility, and industrial skill and prowess.[12] Knowledge of the Royal Navy, 
and of battleships in particular, may not have been very sophisticated, but there was 
certainly a good deal of interest in them, their role and design. 
            When naval cuts started to become public knowledge during 1920, The Times 
quickly condemned the moves as lacking true vision and clarity. In November an 
editorial bemoaned Britain's lack of a modern battle fleet, particularly in terms of 
battleships. It emphasized that both Japan and the USA would soon out-build Britain and 
that such short-sighted parsimony would allow Britain to fall behind. 'Defence by sea is 
still the very condition of the existence of the British empire; and the debt of the world to 
the pacific influence of the British Navy is wholly beyond calculation.'[13] However, the 
editorial also questioned whether battleships were in fact the future of the Navy. This was 
the continuation of a debate opened in the pages of The Times by Admiral Sir Percy Scott 
who had claimed the superiority of the torpedo and the submarine over the battleship.[14] 
In December, Admiral R.H.S. Bacon put the other side of the argument, explaining the 
role of the modern battleship as a destroyer of enemy forces: ‘Battleships… exist to 
impose their will in certain waters’, but with a team of destroyers as defensive and 
protective forces. He advanced the argument that as long as other nations built 
battleships, Britain would need them, and given its worldwide role, would always need 
the biggest and the best. Further, considering Britain's international position, he 
wondered what would happen if a non-European threat emerged and added: 'Whether this 
country does or does not require battleships in the future depends rather on international 
relations and geographical considerations than on the disabilities of the vessels 
themselves.' Drawing on the experience of the last war, he argued that there was no 
conclusive proof to show that the battleship was dead and had been replaced by the 
destroyer and the submarine. Finally, he raised a prophetic point telling his audience that 
if Britain lost its pool of skilled maritime labour for want of work now it would be hard to 
re-establish it in an emergency situation.[15] Thus Admiral Bacon echoed the feelings of 
Beatty. 
            Pathé Gazette newsreel asked ‘Are Battleships Obsolete?’, but didn’t really 
question them as it showed shots of the Atlantic Fleet making an ‘imposing sight’ leaving 
for a spring cruise led by the battleships HMSs Barham and Valiant.[16] In another 
newsreel it reassured its viewers that ‘whilst critics theorise and experts prophesy 
revolutionary changes in battleship constructions, the Navy just “gets on with the 
job”’.[17] 
            Popular literature on the Navy maintained the significance and importance of 
battleships. Sir George Aston’s, The Navy of To-day, published in 1927 and prefaced by 
Lord Jellicoe, commander of the Grand Fleet between 1914 and 1916 and then First Sea 
Lord, used sporting analogies to belittle the threat of air power: 
  
Writing as an onlooker, with no experience of hitting aeroplanes in the air, but 
plenty of experience in missing driven partridges, the opinion I have formed is 
that fire would probably be effective against the more deadly torpedo-planes, but 
ineffective against the speedy and spectacular little fighters, from which, 
however, battleships have little to fear if the personnel on deck have some light 
cover.[18] 
  
Aston clearly believed that aircraft could not inflict fatal wounds on battleships, 
but were capable of causing damage. ‘On the whole,’ he concluded, ‘air-power can be 
described as an aid to sea-power, never likely to be a substitute for it.’[19] Clarence 
Winchester’s The King’s Navy, published in 1936 in conjunction with the Navy Week’s 
Committee (see below), contained an article by Hector C. Bywater, naval and shipping 
correspondent of the Daily Telegraph. For Bywater, air power had a role, but it was as 
yet unproven and the battleship remained ‘the veritable backbone of naval power.’[20] 
            Children’s literature certainly did not discount the value of the battleship. Rupert 
Chesterton’s The Captain of the Phantom recounted the adventures of the Royal Navy’s 
newest battleship, HMS Phantom, a ship graced with the firepower of ‘a super-
Dreadnought and [the ability to] run like a destroyer’.[21] Chesterton’s young readers were 
told of the Phantom’ssuperb engineering and construction, the incredible roar of its main 
armament, and its excellent sea-going qualities. The healthy and kindly influence of 
Britain expressed through its great Navy is also stressed for the Phantom helps a friendly 
Latin-American state to suppress an evil gang of revolutionaries and bandits. When the 
Phantom arrives in the capital of ‘Hondia’, the local people swamp the harbour awed by 
this display of British power: 
  
As the Phantom drew close to the harbour, those on her decks could see that the 
city was wonderfully beflagged and simply alive with people. The piers were 
black with vast crowds, craft of all kinds, packed with passengers, cruised up and 
down; and the masts of the anchored warships were a blaze of bunting. 
Simultaneously the bells of every church in the city – and there were scores of 
them – commenced to peal, and the throngs of people that crowded every point of 
vantage started to cheer.[22] 
  
            However, not all were so sanguine about the value of battleships. The issue of 
naval disarmament continued the debate over the utility and role of battleships. A Topical 
Budget newsreel asked ‘can the war-weary world find lasting peace?’ during the 
Washington negotiations.[23] Others saw this question in a very different manner. At the 
conclusion of the London negotiations in 1930, a correspondent to The Times bemoaned 
Britain’s pusillanimous signing of the naval treaty. He complained that it tied Britain’s 
hands until 1936 and yet made no concession to the fact that naval defence was 
paramount to the nation’s security. Quoting Jellicoe, he wrote it was ‘one instance more 
of the British Empire making concessions which no other nation is asked to make on the 
naval side, the British Empire being the one nation above all others which is absolutely 
dependent on its sea communications.’[24] By contrast, Pathé Gazette, following the 
government line as newsreel companies so often did, welcomed a ‘battleship building 
“holiday” for five years’ on the signing of the London Treaty.[25] 
While praising the long and glorious history of the Royal Navy, a children’s book 
on the Navy of 1932 took an equally conformist line. Singularly lacking the Nelson 
touch, a rare quality in children’s books on the Navy, and despite the title, The Splendid 
Book of the Navy, the book defended the Washington Treaty on rather dull economic 
terms: 
  
in these days, when the cost of a battleship of great size runs to several millions of 
pounds, the tax-payer will think it all to the good that no country shall be allowed 
to go on building at its own sweet will – or by the depth of its pocket. It is a good 
thing for us, too, since we have a big National Debt and, the United States could 
easily out build us if she desired because of her immense wealth.[26] 
  
There is an atmosphere of introspection here, totally at odds with the self-confident image 
of the Royal Navy. 
When negotiations for naval disarmament were re-opened in 1935, British 
Movietone asked whether ‘powers can prevent armaments race?’[27] While in 1923, 
Topical Budget assured its viewers of Britain’s good intentions, stating: ‘Britain keeps 
her word… To honour Washington Naval Treaty HMS Neptune is scrapped at Blyth-on-
Tyne.’[28] 
            On the whole, however, battleships were regarded as immensely important not 
simply for national defence and pride, but also as symbols of local prestige and economic 
health. Given the steep decline in Britain’s industrial position in the inter-war years, and 
the deep depression of heavy industries in particular, naval contracts were vital to the 
vibrancy of shipbuilding communities. Of course, the biggest and best contracts were for 
battleships. When the government announced the decision to build ‘two super-Hoods’ in 
1921, MPs in maritime engineering constituencies welcomed it and all announced their 
fervent hope that their particular constituents would feel the benefit.[29] A year later the 
contracts for the Rodney and the Nelson were announced. The Rodney was to be built on 
the Mersey and Nelson on the Tyne, both cities were overjoyed, as was Sheffield whose 
steel works would go into full production, but there was intense disappointment on 
Clydeside at being overlooked.[30] Such vast projects meant economic repercussions far 
beyond the immediate builder and suppliers. Battleship contracts were also regarded as 
good for the imperial economy. The Liverpool Daily News announced that Cammell 
Laird’s contract to build the Prince of Wales would mean the ‘spending of £5,500,000 
across the Empire.’[31] The lead was to come from Australia, nickel from Canada, timber 
from Borneo and Burma. Returning to Britain, the gun-mountings would be made at 
Barrow, the armour plating in Sheffield and Glasgow, the hull and propelling equipment 
in Birkenhead and the whole put together on the Mersey. The loving and painstaking 
attention to detail with which the Liverpool Daily News recorded these facts reveals the 
intense importance of the battleship to the community.[32] On the launching of HMS King 
George V at the Armstrong works on the Tyne in 1939, Admiral Sir Roger Backhouse 
‘stunned [the crowd] into the silence’ by announcing that another battleship order was to 
be placed on Tyneside. ‘I realize well what this means in the way of work and in 
continuity of employment’, he said, ‘and I am therefore very happy to give you this 
news’.[33] An inset in the Newcastle Journal explained ‘What New Battleship Order 
Means’: the spending of £12 million locally, 70 per cent of which was to go in wages, 58 
per cent of the entire work was to be completed in local shipyards and engine works - at 
least 6,000 men were to be employed on the hull and machinery alone. In addition, much 
of the work dedicated to the manufacturing of equipment, fittings and components would 
also be undertaken in the North East.[34] 
            Launching ceremonies were enormously significant for local pride.[35] They 
served the important purpose of linking the local to the national and imperial; they also 
acted as a focus for cross-class consensus: the great and the good never missed the 
opportunity of heaping praise on the workforce. The Princess Royal launched HMS 
Prince of Wales and told the vast crowd that she was glad to be back in the same yard in 
which she had launched HMS Rodney in 1925. She regarded the two ships as her 
‘godchildren’, and thus cemented the London-based Royal Family to the City of 
Liverpool. Further linking the capital to the provinces, she passed on the express thanks 
of the Admiralty to ‘this famous shipyard with is long and close association with the 
Royal Navy’. Geoffrey Shakespeare, the local MP, paid tribute to the Trades Unions for 
their co-operation with the management, and added: 
  
The workmen were looking upon their work as a sort of livelihood, but were 
working with a greater pride because they realised that they were building not 
merely great ships, but something more, they were building the might of Britain, 
the home of freedom, beneath the haven of whose roof they could shelter 
safely.[36] 
  
Such comments reflected the vision held by so many members of the conservative British 
establishment. For such people Britain was a happy breed of free-living men, held 
together on their island by tight-knit bonds. 
            A similar spirit permeated the launch of the King George V. King George VI and 
Queen Elizabeth travelled to Tyneside for the ceremony, and as the local newspaper 
carefully pointed out, the King lingered much longer than his schedule allowed at the 
Vickers-Armstrong factory where he spoke to workers about the manufacture of the gun-
mountings. The editorial of the Newcastle Journal noted on the launch: ‘Yesterday they 
[the King and Queen] saw what Tyneside can do in the matter of national defence, saw 
the great part its workers are playing in essential armament work, and we are happy to 
know that Tyneside will be entrusted with still more.’[37] 
            The general public’s main chance to see battleships close-up was via the 
newsreels, Navy Weeks and regattas. As Bell has shown, the Admiralty retained a rather 
ambiguous view of cinema, particularly of feature- length commercial productions that 
might slip into melodrama, but had a slightly higher regard for the newsreels.[38] 
Cinemagoers – of which the there were vast numbers throughout the twenties, thirties and 
forties – witnessed the Navy glorified at every turn in the newsreels, and battleships were 
always the stars.[39] ‘The World’s Greatest Battleship – Ours!’ was how Topical Budget 
greeted the launching of HMS Nelson.[40] When Pathé Gazette covered the visit of the 
Dominion premiers to the Fleet in 1926, audiences saw the picture rock violently 
followed by this caption: 
  
The Fleet of England is Her All- in-All (Tennyson). Dominion Premiers see awe-
inspiring display of Britain’s sea power. The great 15” guns of Hood, Repulse and 
Renown open fire. Notice that jar? It’s not the operator or cameraman’s fault – it 
is the repercussion which lifted our cameraman and his machine on HMS Hood 
every time she fired! ‘Rule Britannia’.[41] 
  
Fleet exercises were covered and exciting shots were shown, as in 1930 when Nelson and 
Rodney were seen zig-zagging and raising their guns.[42] Similarly, the coverage of the 
1934 exercises was dominated by shots of Queen Elizabeth firing her guns.[43] 
            Naturally enough, a huge Spithead Review marked King George V’s Silver 
Jubilee in 1935. It provided The Times with the opportunity to indulge in some purple 
prose concerning Britain’s mystical relationship with the sea and the Royal Navy, the 
twin founts of all its greatness. The affection in which Britain held its Navy was stressed 
in the editorial, identifying it as an affection based upon the proximity of the Navy to the 
island. Whereas the British army had fought mainly expeditionary wars, the Navy ‘has 
fought and patrolled directly on our own threshold’. And of all the ships on display it was 
the great battleships Rodney and Nelson that most clearly reflected Britain’s proud naval 
heritage: ‘The two giants, Nelson and Rodney, are so well known of themselves that we 
almost think of the names primarily as of ships and not of the great Admirals who saved 
England.’ But, as always, the pacific nature of Britain’s naval strength was stressed, 
reminding all that the Navy did not stand for aggression: 
  
The review yesterday was of a Fleet which no nation in the world feels to be a 
menace. Rather is it recognised to be a stabilizing factor for the peace of the 
world, and, moreover, the absolute minimum that our Imperial needs warrant. For 
such a Navy, no less than the efficiency of the ships, officers and men, there is 
reason for a double pride.[44] 
  
            Navy Weeks served to increase the British public’s reverence for the Senior 
Service, and its battleships were always the most popular attraction. Navy Week had been 
established in 1926 as a way of bringing the reality of the fleet home to the British 
people.[45] It was no doubt partly a tactical move by the Admiralty and Navy League to 
maintain a high profile for the service and thus lessen the likelihood of further 
economies. They proved to be highly successful propaganda campaigns. Attendances 
rose throughout the thirties and reveal remarkably little sign of being diminished by a 
supposed revulsion against all things military. In 1931, a period often identified as the 
height of British pacifism, Portsmouth alone had 25,000 visitors on one day.[46] As the 
day in question was an ordinary working day (Monday), the figure seems all the more 
remarkable.[47] Three years later, 155,098 people attended the Navy Week at its centres of 
Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth. By 1937 the figures stood at 400,000.[48] Revealing 
the importance of battleships to these displays, The Times reminded its readers that a visit 
to the Chatham Week always required a bit more planning as the battleships couldn’t get 
close in. This meant spectators interested in seeing them had to travel to Sheerness.[49] 
‘The world’s biggest battleship [HMS Rodney] which cost £7,500,000 to build’, was 
always a big attraction: ‘As last year, the battleship Rodney, her big guns pointing 
skyward, was the most popular vessel on view. Hosts of visitors – who would have 
benefited by experience in steeplejacking – climbed the steel ladders and explored the 
electrically lit corridors in the heart of the ship.’[50] 
            Schoolboys could complete their knowledge of battleships and the history of the 
Royal Navy in general by collecting cigarette cards. It has been possible to identify 
twenty sets dedicated to the Navy, including three sets specifically on British battleships, 
produced between 1920 and 1940.[51] When HMS Renown carried the Prince of Wales on 
his empire tours of 1920, 1921, 1925, and the Duke and Duchess of York on their tours in 
1926 and 1927, it was mentioned in passing almost continually by the press, such 
references show that battleships were ubiquitous: they were part of the wallpaper of 
British life. 
            Showing the flag, as the battleships did on the royal tours, was an important way 
of impressing British power on the world. Battleships of the Royal Navy drew just as 
many admiring guests in the empire and in other countries as they did at home. HMS 
Hood had the greatest reputation. As many of its historians have pointed out, Hood had a 
special ability to inspire admiration which lay in the beauty of its appearance.[52] In the 
words of Edwin Hoyt, ‘Hood was known throughout the world as the greatest and finest 
sea-fighting instrument afloat.’[53] Hood achieved this fame by its many courtesy visits. 
Kept company by the Repulse, Hood went on a world tour in 1923-4, stopping in South 
Africa, Zanzibar, Ceylon, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific Islands, San 
Francisco, the Panama Canal, Jamaica, Canada and Newfoundland. A Melbourne girl 
remembered the arrival of the ships: ‘Every road and pathway was thick, and many 
families were making a day of it, taking out all the children and hampers of food and 
bottles of beer. The Bay was dotted with sailing boats.’[54] The tour was described as ‘the 
most successful cruise by a squadron of warships in the history of sea-power.’[55] 
            Like all such cruises, it was a carefully stage-managed public relations exercise 
and the crews were under strict instructions to maintain an image of dignity and 
professionalism. On arrival in Sweden, the Captain threw a party to mark the King of 
Sweden’s birthday; it showed ‘northern friends that Britain had come out of the war with 
her naval reputation undiminished.’[56] An Hawaiian Boy Scout chosen to represent his 
islands at a gathering in Copenhagen who had missed his steamer passage was given free 
accommodation in the boys’ mess-deck and taken to his destination. A shrewd move that 
earned favourable press coverage in the USA; and when the ship put in to San Francisco, 
the mayor, awe-struck by the Hood, said, ‘we surrender our city unto you. We 
capitulate.’[57] 
            Slightly closer to home, the Rodney caused equal excitement when it arrived at 
Portrush in Ulster. A former officer recalled: 
  
From Belfast in the south to Derry in the west, the men, women and children of 
this appreciative province descended upon us. They rolled into Portrush by 
ordinary trains and special trains, by car, bus, and bicycle. They thronged the jetty 
in gay, excited crowds.[58] 
  
The ship even managed to make a £70 profit from the sale souvenirs![59] 
            But the most interesting and revealing of the connections between British 
battleships and the wider world is the case of HMS Malaya. The people of the Federated 
Malay States financed the building of the ship; it was their contribution towards the 
defence of the empire. Originally, it had been the brainchild of Sultan Idris of Perak. His 
energy and ambition provided the initial dynamic behind the project. By instigating and 
encouraging the idea the Sultan revealed that he was a loyal subject of the British Empire 
and ensured the authorities would smile on his rule. It also gave him further kudos among 
his own people. HMS Malaya was therefore far more than an instrument of war; it was a 
symbol of the intelligence and beneficence inherent in the ruling partnerships that made 
up the British Empire. As the formal address by the Federal Council to the Captain said: 
  
[the ship] will enhance in their eyes [the people of the Federated Malay States] the 
wisdom, and foresight of their rulers whose cordial and unanimous support 
enabled Sultan Idris’s proposals to be carried to fruition and it will strengthen 
their devotion to His Majesty the King Emperor who personifies for us all both 
the unity and strength of the British Empire and the splendid traditions of the 
Imperial Navy of which he is the exalted chief.[60] 
  
            The battleship was also proof to the world of Malaya’s political and economic 
maturity. It revealed Malaya to be a full partner in the global concerns of the British 
Empire: ‘It is the symbol of a feeling of individual partnership on equal terms amongst all 
who enjoy the protection of British rule.’[61] A battleship was therefore the symbol of 
nationhood and provided a young, artificially constructed nation with a heritage. This 
message was certainly maintained by the Malaya Leader, and its whole-hearted 
commitment to the project must have played a part in stoking the intense sense of interest 
which increased as the colony awaited the arrival of the new ship. ‘The expectations, 
anticipations, and excitement of weeks culminated to-day, when Malaya’s battleship was 
sighted shortly after 8 am… it will long remain a memorable day in the annals of the 
Malay Peninsula.’[62] Battleships obviously provided global reach and influence in more 
ways than one. 
When war broke out in Europe in 1939 and in the Far East in 1941, the battleships 
had to prove whether they could perform the task of defending British interests. 
Historians have debated the worth of battleships in the Second World War with a good 
deal of passion. The case against battleships and those who foresaw their use in great 
fleet actions stresses the misunderstanding and under-rating of air power and aircraft 
carriers in the inter-war period. Thus, the carrier actions of the conflict are identified as 
the truly decisive and important moments – Pearl Harbor, the Mariana ‘Turkey-Shoot’, 
Taranto and the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse.[63] However, others have 
produced a much more complex and subtle interpretation. According to the naval 
historians Alan Raven and John Roberts, the job of the battleship was to destroy the 
enemy's capital ships, and in pre-war planning most navies saw aviation as the aerial 
cavalry, keeping the enemy in play and slowing it down until the heavy units arrived with 
their superior gunnery. In the Mediterranean where it was possible for battleship fleets to 
come face to face, the extreme reluctance of the Italian Navy to come to battle made 
aircraft carrier strikes the best possible way to slow down the enemy, or force it into 
action. They argue that in many instances the much-vaunted superiority of the aircraft 
carrier was only equal to that of the battleship, not superior to it citing the action against 
the Scharnhorst as evidence: it occurred at night and was thus beyond the capability of 
aircraft. The sinking of the Bismarck was greatly assisted by aircraft, but could probably 
have been achieved by battleships alone. Thus the aircraft, especially when tied to the 
aircraft carrier, was not the absolute superior of the battleship.[64] 
Interpreting those who were circumspect about air power before the war as 
hopelessly reactionary ignores the very real problems of maritime aviation, which served 
to undermine its threat. Most bombs were far too crude to cause much damage to a 
battleship; torpedoes were a far greater danger, as proved at Pearl Harbor, Taranto, and in 
the sinkings of the Bismarck, Repulse and Prince of Wales. Those who supported the 
utility of the battleship reasonably argued that all the new developments demanded was 
that battleships moved with adequate air cover, not that they were obsolete. Stating that 
battleships already deployed destroyer screens for their protection and assistance, such 
observers simply demanded the addition of aircraft carriers to the destroyer element in 
order to meet the new threat. Therefore air power expressed by aircraft carriers was not 
the clear-cut replacement of the battleship that should have been recognised by any right-
minded admiral or student of naval power. According to historians such as Raven and 
Roberts the real lesson of the war was much more subtle and mixed. The conflict did not 
so much prove that battleships were obsolete as that aircraft carriers could act 
independently. Simply by proving parity with battleships in certain theatres aircraft 
carriers did enough to displace them. Carrier fleets clashed without ever seeing each other 
or even needing indirect firepower from a battleship. This situation held sway in the vast 
oceans of the Pacific, but it was different in the European theatre. Neither Germany nor 
Italy possessed an aircraft carrier and the threat to British warships in the Mediterranean 
and Atlantic came from land-based aircraft. In addition, the carriers of the Navy in 1939 
were neither numerous enough nor equipped with effective enough aircraft to make them 
the cutting edge of the Royal Navy.[65] 
Raven and Roberts conclude by arguing that between 1939 and 1945 a 
combination of circumstances undermined the battleship, none of which were clear in 
1939. Navies kept battleships because there was always the risk that ‘if a battleship had 
managed to come within gun range of a fleet without them, it could in theory destroy that 
fleet and any operation it was involved in’.[66] During the conflict aspects of this debate 
would surface in British society. However, for much of the time Royal Navy battleships 
were presented in precisely the way the British public expected: as decisive weapons 
crewed by intensely professional sailors. 
Battleships were also very reassuring and their seemingly invulnerable qualities 
made them good metaphors for the nation. 'Steady, powerful and confident, like one of 
her own battleships, Britain rises from the sea’, said the Ealing Studios’ 1940 
documentary film, Mastery of the Sea.[67] Self-contained, and self-reliant, battleships 
encapsulated what the British thought of themselves. Verity, a documentary production 
company, made Battleship for the Ministry of Information in 1942. The film looked at 
life onboard King George V and stressed the elements of self-reliance and teamwork – 
precisely the qualities demanded by the people’s war.  Emphasis was laid on the diversity 
of skills and occupations found onboard the ship from bakers and cooks to printers and 
photographers. A dramatic finale shows the battleship ploughing through heavy seas as 
the commentary states: ‘As she sails forth at the head of the fleet, there may come at any 
moment that encounter with the enemy which will bring forth the finest and best of 
everyman onboard. That spirit which will uphold the traditions and reputation associated 
with her name, HMS King George V.’[68] A similar spirit infused British Gaumont’s 
Commissioning a Battleship, a short documentary on the commissioning of HMS Howe. 
In keeping with pre-war traditions great stress was laid on the skill and dedication of the 
workforce that had built the ship. Howe is presented as a tremendously powerful weapon, 
‘Her total firepower is like a minor earthquake’, and she represents ‘45,000 tons of ocean 
might.’[69] British Gaumont newsreel was equally reassuring and cocky when it described 
the debut of the Prince of Wales on convoy work: ‘We are proud to show you now the 
first pictures of another of Britain’s giant new battleships… Oh, what a surprise for the 
Fuhrer’.[70] And, as in the twenties and thirties, battleships continued to be the darling of 
naval gatherings and the guarantee of Britain’s pledge of protection to her far- flung 
empire. Wartime naval weeks were not quite as spectacular as the pre-war events, but 
they still raised public awareness. The government used these events to raise money by 
asking communities to sponsor a warship. In November 1941 Liverpool was absolutely 
determined to adopt its home-built addition to the fleet, the Prince of Wales. The cost of 
adopting the battleship was not inconsiderable, for a figure of £10 million was set. 
Amazingly, the citizens and businesses of Liverpool reached the sum of £14.5 million 
beating off the nearest rival of Glasgow which raised £13.5 million.[71] At the same time, 
HMS Prince of Wales was making its way towards Singapore to act, in Churchill’s 
words, as ‘a decisive deterrent’ against Japanese ambitions.[72] 
            Large crowds welcomed the Prince of Wales when she arrived at Cape Town in 
November 1941 accompanied by the Repulse. An estimated 600 cars whisked the crew 
away for receptions, parties and sightseeing tours. It was an extraordinary act of 
hospitality and a reflection of the awe in which battleships were still held. The next stop 
was Ceylon, and then it was on to the great naval base at Singapore. As at Cape Town, 
the locals turned out in numbers to witness the arrival of the beautiful ship. The 
Singapore Free Press echoed the feeling that battleships were the supreme weapon of 
war and therefore the best guard against attack: 
  
It is big news not only for Singapore and Malaya but for the whole of the 
democratic countries bordering on the Pacific; it is bad news fo r Japan which may 
begin to see the shattering of her hopes for an unopposed naval advance to the 
south.[73] 
  
The Times announced the arrival of the newly constituted Eastern Fleet at 
Singapore, and referred to it as a ‘formidable force’. Although supposedly constrained by 
security from mentioning the names of all the ships detached, it was possible to name the 
Prince of Wales as chief among them. In fact there was very little attempt to keep the 
arrival secret. Foreign journalists were allowed onboard the Prince of Wales and were 
lectured on the cutting-edge technology incorporated into the ship’s construction. This 
advertising of the ship’s presence goes some way towards confirming the suspicions of 
Martin Middlebrook and Patrick Mahoney, who have studied the loss of the two ships, 
that the leak was a deliberate attempt to warn off Japan. The Times stated that ‘It was the 
news for which Europeans and Asians alike had been waiting.’[74] 
Even more confident of the battleship-effect was Major Fielding Eliot, a military 
correspondent, whose syndicated column appeared in a variety of newspapers including 
the London Daily Telegraph and the Malaya Tribune. According to Eliot, the new 
arrivals would keep the Japanese navy from venturing into the South China Sea. ‘In fact, 
the arrival of some British battleships at Singapore would render the Japanese naval 
problem in the Pacific quite hopeless.’ Turning to Japanese naval aviation he made a fatal 
blunder, claiming it was the weakest branch of the imperial navy and would never be able 
to cope with the attrition of war. He was clearly ignorant of Japan’s 1941 output of 5,088 
military aircraft.[75] Just over a week later Japanese aircraft sunk both the Repulse and the 
Prince of Wales. 
            However, the successes of British battleships were presented as proof of British 
naval supremacy. When the British landed an expeditionary force in Norway in April 
1940, Pathé Gazette showed its viewers dramatic shots of the shore bombardment led by 
the battleship HMS Warspite, and the commentator noted, ‘you can see the camera shake 
as our own ship fires her broadside’.[76] This is what the public expected from the Navy 
and battleships in particular. The action at Cape Matapan against the Italian fleet was 
covered in an equally exciting manner, and once again battleships were given pride of 
place in the reportage. For Pathé Gazette it was a chance to show the glory of the British 
fleet while delivering a jibe about Mussolini: ‘Now with pride we offer you a glimpse of 
the British men of war who humbled the fat Fascist pride on his own doorstep, Admiral 
Sir Andrew Cunningham, and the ships Warspite, Valiant, Barham’.[77] British Gaumont 
showed the three battleships at anchor and stated: ‘These are the 15-inch shells – the type 
that shattered a brand-new cruiser in one salvo.’[78] The Times also emphasised the heavy 
shelling the ships had meted out to the Italians referring to ‘the terrific broadsides from 
the British battleships Warspite, Valiant and Barham’.[79] The tremendous blast of 
battleship salvoes was a continual obsession. The ve teran children’s writer Percy 
Westerman, famous for his action-packed adventures based on life in the Navy and 
merchant marine, published his new novel, Fighting for Freedom, in 1941. Revolving 
around the figure of a young midshipman, John Cloche, the action takes place on HMS 
Tremendous, a vintage battleship modernised in the thirties, and obviously modelled on 
the Nelson and Rodney. Westerman describes the huge scale of the ship: ‘Tremendous 
could not be called graceful, but she looked what she was: the floating embodiment of 
Britain’s sea-power.’[80] But it is only when Cloche experiences his first broadside that he 
truly understands the might of the ship: 
  
Suddenly the battleship shook and shuddered. John’s first 
impression was that she had been hit, either by a large shell or by a 
torpedo. He had never heard a salvo fire from four fifteen- inch 
guns. He had heard it now all right, and he was thankful that, like 
those of the gun’s crew, his ears had been plugged with wax 
cones.[81] 
            The events that caused most celebration were, of course, the sinking of other 
battleships, which turned out to be a relatively rare event. When the Scharnhorst was 
sunk, Pathé Gazette rose to the drama of the occasion. The newsreel opened with a 
silhouette of the Duke of York at sea, the commentator then stated: ‘It is fitting that we 
open this… pictorial account of the great Naval action with the huge bulk of the British 
Home Fleet Flagship Duke of York framed in the Arctic darkness in which she brought 
the Scharnhorst to her doom.’ It then went on to emphasise the ‘shattering broadsides’ 
delivered by the battleship.[82] 
            Battleships came back into the news in June 1944 when they supported the 
Normandy landings. Along with most other newspapers, The Times paid tribute to those 
‘household names’ Ramillies, Rodney, King George V and Warspite. In the same issue a 
further report noted ‘Famous Ships Engaged’ and that: 
  
In this war no action would seem complete without the Warspite. She was at the 
second action at Narvik in 1940 before returning to the Mediterranean to become 
the flagship of Sir Andrew Cunningham; she was in the battles of Calabria and 
Cape Matapan, and in the fleet that covered the withdrawal from Greece. Much 
later she supported the Italian landings and was one of the ships whose fire 
restored the position at Salerno. The Rodney was one of the two ships who sank 
the Bismarck, and she too, with her sister ship the Nelson, was in the Sicilian 
operations.[83] 
  
Over the next few weeks The Times reported on the activities of the Nelson and the 
Ramillies, as both continued to engage shore batteries.[84] 
            However, the record of British battleships in the Second World War did not give 
the British press, people or government constant excitement and rejoicing. Battleship 
losses were the cause of much emotion and debate. Most shattering was the loss of HMS 
Hood in May 1941. As has been noted, Hood was the magical medallion of the British 
fleet, and its loss was felt deeply. ‘The destruction of the battle-cruiser Hood is a heavy 
calamity’, remarked a mournful editorial in The Times. ‘With her 42,000 tons 
displacement she was the largest and most powerful warship afloat… the loss of this 
mighty unit makes an acknowledged gap in a fighting line that, especially since the 
defection of our French ally, has had to be stretched round the globe to the utmost limit of 
its elasticity.’[85] Luckily, revenge was extracted very soon afterwards for the Hood’s 
victor, Bismarck, was itself sunk following a dramatic chase across the Atlantic. This 
element allowed newspaper editors to comfort their readers with the thought of a swift 
retribution. ‘When the Hood blew up, the Navy set its teeth and went all out for 
vengeance. Now the account is paid.’ The News Chronicle editorial went on to explain 
that Hitler’s strategic loss was far greater than Britain’s. Having fewer capital ships to 
risk, the loss of the Bismarck was a huge blow to German designs on Britain’s naval 
supremacy.[86] The Times spoke of ‘How the Hood was avenged’, and added that it was a 
‘Thrilling story of relentless pursuit… so ends another of those moments of thunderous 
drama that sometimes break in upon the grim, arduous, silent watch from which the Navy 
in war-time knows no respite.’[87] 
            At the end of 1941 the British public was rocked by the loss of two more 
battleships, Prince of Wales and Repulse. For the city of Liverpool it was as if a member 
of the family had been lost. The Liverpool Daily News referred to the city’s shock, but 
tried to buck spirits by saying that the best form of remembrance was to buy more War 
Bonds for new ships.[88] In Singapore grief mingled with fear over the future as the 
Singapore Free Press commented, ‘Sometimes there is news which no one will 
believe.’[89] The Times bluntly called it a ‘catastrophe’.[90] Home Intelligence was keen to 
measure the effect on public confidence and morale. At first the atmosphere appeared 
reassuring and it was reported that ‘the regard in which the Royal Navy is held… has 
silenced any criticism of the strategy which resulted in their loss.’[91] However, a few 
weeks later it was noted in the end-of-year summary that ‘with the passage of time there 
is increased criticism of the naval authorities concerning the loss of the Prince of Wales 
and Repulse.’[92] This criticism became a lot louder in February 1942 when the German 
battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen managed to sail home from their 
French bases through the Straits of Dover without serious attack in an incident that 
became known as the ‘Channel Dash’. 
            In this atmosphere of anger and recrimination serious questions were asked about 
the direction of the sea war and the utility and significance of battleships. In the wake of 
the Channel Dash, the Daily Telegraph attempted to defend the role and relevance of the 
battleship. Francis McMurtie, the paper’s naval correspondent, wrote a balanced and 
intelligent piece, but its tone inadvertently gave credence to the anti-battleship position. 
First, he dealt with the question of why no battleships were moved south to deal with the 
German ships by reminding his readers that the Navy’s fifteen battleships were hard 
pressed in many other areas. It was then stated that the sinking of the Bismarck required 
five battleships, which meant these ships dropping their other important duties. In 
addition, the constant maintenance battleships required in order to keep them working at 
full efficiency often meant that the strength was diluted still further as one or more 
moved into dock for repair and refit. Finally, Britain’s decision to play by the 
Washington Treaty rules was quoted as a reason for the stresses and strains faced by the 
Navy. In attempting to defend the role and relevance of the battleship, the Telegraph’s 
piece actually raised more questions than it answered.[93] 
When the Hood was sunk questions were asked in the House as to its fitness for 
battle and whether the ship had been strengthened in line with previous 
recommendations. Churchill conceded that the Hood not been fitted with extra armament. 
Major Fielding Eliot writing on the strategic implications of this defeat repeated the 
problems of the battlecruisers. ‘[T]he loss of the Hood is just another bit of evidence that 
the battle cruiser or the armoured cruiser is not fit to lie in the line of battle.’ [94] 
A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, spoke at a Holborn Chamber of 
Commerce luncheon soon after the loss of Prince of Wales and the Repulse. Clearly 
aware of the disquiet the incident had aroused, hetold his audience that the Navy was 
bound to suffer some big losses serving, as it did, in the most dangerous and exposed 
situations. He took on those who criticised the deployment of the ships by saying if they 
had not been sent another critic would certainly have condemned the inaction. Rounding 
on the air cover argument, he asked them to remember Greece, Crete and Dunkirk when 
the Navy managed large operations under constant aerial assault. This relied on a slanted 
reading of those events and hardly reflected the losses inflicted on the Navy during those 
operations.[95] 
The mixed record of battleships during the war diminished somewhat their 
hallowed aura. Aside from the odd spectacular incident, most of Britain’s battleships 
were actually employed on convoy protection duties. While undoubtedly vital to the war 
effort, this rather dull and monotonous work did not make for very good publicity 
material, and new talismans such as the Lancaster bomber slowly eclipsed battleships. 
However, the nation was to have one last battleship sensation and in the form of the last 
of its class built for the Navy, HMS Vanguard. 
Battleship construction was a much-debated policy during the war. In January and 
February 1940 the First Sea Lord argued for four battleships and two 15- inch battle-
cruisers. Admirals Pound and Philips even argued that new battleships should be given 
priority over cruisers and carriers; both men justified their position by stating that such 
ships would play an important role in the anti-u-boat and anti-mine struggle. But given 
the immediacy of the problem facing Britain in the North Atlantic, the War Cabinet 
decided to abandon all long-term construction plans in March 1940. 
In September 1940, the First Sea Lord and Phillips tried to revive the battleships 
programme. Both urged on the production of the Howe and the other battleship projects 
such as the long-awaited Lion and Temeraire, and that two more ships of this class, the 
Thunderer and the Conqueror should be laid down as soon as possible, and a new 
battleship, the Vanguard, should also be built. Pound believed this was even more 
important than a new carrier fleet. This plan was largely undermined by the overstretch of 
British industry and the requirements of other theatres, for the Controller of the Navy 
pointed out that the demand on armour would bring British tank production to a halt. 
In early 1941, the Admiralty tried again with a scaled down list, the Lion and the 
Temeraire, two fleet carriers, ten cruisers and forty to fifty destroyers. But given the 
incredible pressure on armour plate manufacturing, the lack of shipyard space and skilled 
labour, the plan was no more realistic than the last. On 26 March 1941 Churchill 
shrewdly assessing the situation ordered that no vessel was to begin construction that 
could not be completed by the end of 1942.[96] With the scrapping of the Lion and 
Temeraire, the only battleship project left under consideration was the Vanguard. The 
ship was eventually launched in December 1944 amid a strange mix of celebration and 
secrecy. Princess Elizabeth presided over the ceremony accompanied by Admiral 
Cunningham. Both the newspapers and the newsreels covered the occasion, and the BBC 
broadcast it on the Home Service, but none gave the ship’s name or its exact 
specifications. Paramount newsreel told its viewers that ‘Other warships of the same class 
maybe on the stocks, so even the name of this one is not made public.’[97] However, 
Alexander did state that the ship was scheduled to take part in operations in the Far East, 
and then, clearly aware that debate over the future of battleships was underway, he added 
that: ‘This ship is a challenge to the minds of those people who have thought, and who 
still think, that the day of the battleship has ended.’[98] 
Vanguard was, in fact, completed too late to take part in the war; instead it rapidly 
took on a symbolical status at a time when Britain’s naval and world power status was in 
clear decline. Battleships had had their last hurrah in the Second World War, and from 
1945 until the scrapping of the Vanguard in 1960 it is obvious that these ships began to 
slip from public attention. The Vanguard was never the darling of the British people in 
the way that the mighty Hood had been. Establishing the profile of the ship in British 
popular culture is a lot more difficult compared with its predecessors. Fewer and fewer 
people regarded the battleship as the ultimate expression of Britain’s influence, although 
it is clear that some found it hard to accept that battleships were anything other than the 
last word in seapower. The 1947 edition of Harry Goulding’s The Wonder Book of the 
Navy is a good example and this highly traditional book on the Silent Service maintained 
that: 
  
in spite of the dash and excitement associated with the work of destroyers and 
submarines, the mighty battleships will always retain their interest. As bankers 
would say, they are the ‘gold reserve’ of the Navy, and although many arguments 
have been advanced in favour of replacing them with submarines and small craft, 
no Navy has yet done so.[99] 
  
Remaining true to naval traditions, Goulding argued that a strong navy allowed Britain to 
raise its flag across the globe, outstretch the hand of British friendship and maintain the 
stability of international relations.[100] 
            Lieutenant-Commander P.K. Kemp took a similar line in his 1953 book, The 
Boy’s Book of the Navy. Kemp maintained that although battleship actions had been rare 
in the war and air power had made itself felt at sea, the battleship was still the vital 
protector of the vulnerable aircraft carrier. A whole chapter was then devoted to life 
onboard Vanguard, ‘the most modern battleship in the world… the biggest ever built in 
this country’, but he was forced to admit that, ‘very probably she will be the last one to be 
built.’[101] 
            Vanguard was given much prestige and publicity as the ship that took the Royal 
Family on its trip to South Africa in February 1947.[102] When the royal party returned to 
Portsmouth in May, over half a million people turned out to see them and the new 
battleship.[103] The ship also made guest appearances in films. Somewhat ironically, on 
both occasions it stood- in for German warships: along with the USS Salem it played the 
Graf Spee in Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger’s The Battle of the River Plate 
(1957), and the Bismarck in Lewis Gilbert’s Sink the Bismarck (1961).[104] It was also 
presented as a crucial part of Britain’s defence during the Cold War. The Admiralty was 
certainly very keen to promote the ship’s excellent sea-handling capabilities supplying 
the newsreel companies with footage of the Vanguard retaining stability while pushing 
through ‘very heavy seas’.[105] 
            However, such celebrations of British power and influence were being 
undermined by reality. British war films might have presented a glorious vision of the 
nation at its best under the trials of conflict, but by the 1950s the hard evidence proved 
that Britain’s heyday had passed and military technology was advancing apace. Airpower 
combined with the development of atomic weapons had fundamentally altered defence 
scenarios, and the day of the battleship had passed. In addition, tough decisions had to be 
taken on Britain’s defence budgets. Desiring money to spend on atomic weapons 
programmes and to fund Britain’s ambitious welfare programmes, successive British 
governments were forced to juggle with the nation’s finances.[106] The Vanguard was 
barely completed when questions were raised in Parliament about its role. On that 
occasion Alexander told the Committee of Supply that all battleship building had been 
scrapped but he declined to comment on future developments.[107] Despite service in 
NATO fleets and impressive performances in many fleet exercises, by the mid-fifties it 
had become clear that there was, in fact, no further use for the Vanguard and the 
enormous cost of maintaining it could no longer be borne. On 12 September 1955 the 
First Sea Lord, J.P.L. Thomas, was forced to reverse his adamant decision of a year 
earlier that the Vanguard would not be relegated to the reserve.[108]  The four surviving 
battleships of the King George V class accompanied the Vanguard into mothballs.[109] 
            Critics of the Navy’s finances were now given the chance to express their deep 
misgivings about battleships. ‘May all those who pay taxes or vote money to the Navy 
resist the survival of the paralytic mastodon, the Vanguard’, wrote Reginald Bennett MP. 
Implying that battleships had becoming outmoded during the Great War by referring to 
the Gallipoli expedition of 1915, he added: ‘To convert her to post-Dardanelles weapons 
will be, by all accounts prohibitive, and she will swallow up men like a Moloch’.[110] 
Over the next few years the debate swung to and fro. In February 1957 the First Lord, 
Lord Selkirk, hinted that the Vanguard should be kept in service partly thanks to the 
money saved by scrapping the King George V class. However, a month later a group of 
Labour MPs called for the immediate scrapping of all Britain’s remaining battleships. In 
April the Vanguard survived the cuts demanded by the Defence White Paper which 
sealed the fate of the King George V class. It was a brief respite, however, for in August 
1958 the Select Committee on Estimates stated that even in reserve the Vanguard cost 
£230,000 a year, her last refit had cost £720,000 and she had burned 6000 tons of oil in 
the last year. The Admiralty fought hard to retain the ship stressing its value as a training 
vessel, but to no avail.[111] 
            Not surprisingly, the decision brought forth a wave of nostalgia and regret 
particularly among the communities that had built the ships. When HMS Nelson was 
scrapped in 1955, the Newcastle Evening Chronicle paid tribute to the great ship. 
Stressing its important role in the war, the article then went on to emphasis its deep 
connections with Newcastle, and concluded: ‘For almost 30 years HMS Nelson had 
added fresh glory to the name of Tyneside shipbuilding. Her name and her record live 
on.’[112] When the Vanguard was taken away for scrap, The Times commented ‘her 
passing marks not only the end of a fine ship, but the end of an era.’[113] However, at just 
this moment battleships had a new lease of life – in kit form. Airfix models gave young 
Britons the chance to relive and rebuild the legendary names of the Royal Navy. A 1961 
Airfix catalogue carried a picture of HMS Nelson on its front-cover and announced: ‘The 
mighty battleship HMS Nelson is only one of the famous warships you can make from 
Airfix Construction Kits. The wonderful model is packed with detail – rotating gun 
turrets, anti-aircraft guns, whalers and cutters, all made from a 134-part kit costing 7/-
.’[114] The series was also to include models of the Hood, Warspite and a set of German 
battleships.[115] The battleship had passed into history symbolised by the 1960 edition of 
Kemp’s Boy’s Book of the Navy. Seven years earlier its original edition had dedicated a 
whole chapter to the Vanguard, now both the Vanguard chapter and the battleships 
chapter were omitted in favour of new material.[116] 
Battleships played a significant role in British life throughout the period 1920-
1960; they had an important profile in the local, national and imperial imagination. 
Between 1920 and 1939 there were debates as to the utility and function of battleships, 
but such arguments were largely insignificant compared with the enormous degree of 
faith and trust invested in them by people across the British world. Battleships were both 
a symbolic and factual guarantee of British and imperial jobs, products, values and 
freedoms. In the Second World War the reality and experience of modern naval conflict 
proved battleships to be of mixed value, however they still clung (just) to their 
mysterious aura. In the post-1945 world the benefits of maintaining these vessels in a 
rapidly changing world forced them into retirement and saw them gradually eclipsed in 
British popular culture; although the scrapping of the Vanguard, an almost forgotten relic 
of a by-gone world, resurrected some interest, regret and nostalgia. Ironically, 
considering their great power and size, battleships appeared to have a heart and soul and 
were therefore held in much great affection than the faceless, impersonal, indiscriminate 
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